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Abstract: This policy brief has been written 
in the context of the demand of developing 
countries, including India, in the on-going 
Doha round of WTO negotiations for policy 
space within which protect the livelihood 
security of their small and marginal 
farmers. It uses Mexican agriculture’s 
integration experience under NAFTA to 
establish that developing country demands 
are justified. It points out that despite the 
gains Mexican agriculture has made under 
NAFTA, the very nature of those gains 
meant that the brunt of adjustment was 
borne by small and marginal farmers. This 
came about both because of the 
retrenchment of the state and the nature of 
investment flows under NAFTA. Finally it 
suggests an alternative agricultural 
modernisation model centered on small and 
marginal farmers and maximisation of 
employment growth. 
 
*** 
 
The paper is divided into three parts: Section 
I briefly introduces how developing 
countries have sought to protect the interests 
of small and marginal farmers in the on-
going Doha round and the current state of 
play in those negotiations. Section II 
discuses the integration of Mexican 
agriculture in global markets under NAFTA 
and why the brunt of the adjustment was 
borne by small and marginal farmers. And 
finally, Section III proposes an alternate 
model of agricultural modernization 
centered on small-farmers and why for 
developing countries the stakes are much 
higher than for Mexico. 
 
I: Introduction - Special Products and the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism 
 
At the heart of addressing livelihood 
concerns of small farmers in developing 
countries in the on-going Doha round of 
WTO negotiations is the designation of 
Special Products (SPs) and Special 
Safeguard Mechanisms (SSM) in the 
Agreement on Agriculture. Developing 
countries have argued that SPs - products 
linked to food security and livelihood 
security - should either be subject to no 
tariffs or small reductions. An SSM would 
allow a temporary increase of relevant tariffs 
in response to a pre-specified increase in 
import volumes or decline in price levels. In 
designing the use of both these instruments 
the G33 and other developing country 
groupings in the WTO have sought to 
amplify the policy space available to 
developing countries in dealing with 
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livelihood concerns while continuing to 
integrate into the global economy. 
 
The reason for framing livelihood issues in 
this manner is the understanding that small 
and marginal farmers, at least in most 
developing countries including India, lead 
an exceedingly precarious economic 
existence and are not positioned to compete 
effectively in relatively open agricultural 
markets, particularly given the levels of 
subsidies enjoyed by agricultural producers 
in developed countries. Therefore, first, in a 
situation where reasonable opportunities of 
migrating out of agriculture are limited even 
in rapidly growing economies, forcing 
farmers off their land through import 
competition is both economically and 
politically unsustainable. Second, given the 
above, the flexibilities sought in the use of 
instruments have to be put in the context of 
the seriously limited policy space available 
to developing countries in helping small and 
marginal farmers cope with import 
competition, given that direct production 
subsidies of various sorts are WTO-illegal. 
 
In this light, Crawford Falconer’s new 
negotiating text for the Agreement on 
Agriculture makes disappointing reading. 
By offering that the SSM be activated if 
prices decline by 30% or more and far fewer 
SPs than the G33 have asked for1, the text 
makes a mockery of livelihood concerns of 
small farmers that is at the heart of the 
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developing country and Indian position. 
Little wonder then that India has said that 
the new text is “totally unacceptable”2. More 
specifically, the G33 statement 26th May 
2008 commenting on the draft text says 
“that specific fundamental elements of SPs 
& SSM have not been incorporated.”3 
Equally pointedly, the statement of the 
Small Vulnerable Economies Group on the 
draft text notes, among other things, that as 
far as the SSM is concerned, “lamentably 
the text is very far from reflecting a possible 
agreement, because the dispositions 
contained therein turn it into a mechanism 
without utility for the developing 
countries.”4 
 
II: Mexico - NAFTA and agricultural 
modernization 
 
For anybody who doubts that, without 
safeguards, the brunt of adjustment costs of 
integrating relatively low-productivity 
agriculture into international markets is 
borne by small and marginal farmers, a close 
look at Mexico’s post-NAFTA experience 
would be salutary. Even Felipe Calderon, 
Mexico’s President and an acolyte of 
neoliberal economics, has had to 
acknowledge that Mexico, at least in part as 
a result of agriculture’s integration into 
global markets, is faced with an 
unprecedented agrarian crisis. At a recent 
press conference in May when the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel was visiting 
Mexico, he said that high levels of subsidies 
available to European and US farmers had a 
debilitating effect on the competitiveness of 
Mexican farmers, resulting in a large 
number of his compatriots migrating to the 
US “abandoning land, because it was simply 
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 See ‘No trade deal without livelihood concerns: India’, 
Hindu News Update Service, 20th May 2008. 
3
 See page 3 of the G-33 Statement: COA-SS Open Ended, 
26th May 2008. Available at 
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Especial, 26th May 2008. Translation mine. Available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=102830  
 
  3 
impossible to compete with subsidies in 
other countries”5. 
 
To be sure all of Mexican agriculture’s 
current problems cannot be ascribed to 
NAFTA. They go back at least to the early 
1980s, when the “sowing petroleum” 
strategy – using oil revenues and public 
investment to subsidise agricultural growth 
and achievement of food-security - 
collapsed on the back of sharply declining 
oil prices and the subsequent debt crisis of 
19826. In the macroeconomic retrenchment 
that followed agriculture suffered sharp cuts 
in public investment and subsidy levels. But 
it was Mexico’s accession into GATT in 
1986 that made possible a new strategy 
based on global economic integration.  
 
As a result in 1989, during Carlos Salinas’s 
presidency, a strategy of agricultural 
‘modernization’, centered around global 
integration, private investment and markets, 
was put in place. Salinas amended the 
Mexican Constitution to make it easier to 
buy and sell communally owned land, 
substantially reduced the role of the state in 
rural economic activity including the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
distribution and storage and moved relative 
prices in favour of agricultural exports. This 
of course has to situated within the overall 
swing in Mexican economic policy making 
that took place in the late 1980s towards 
market fundamentalism. The hope was that 
secure property rights and a market-led 
economy would ensure a private investment 
driven revival of agricultural growth in line 
with comparative advantage7. 
 
                                                          
5
 See ‘El país paga un “costo muy alto” para evitar aumentos 
de precios’, Angélica Enciso, La Jornada, 20th May 2008. 
Translation mine. Available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/05/20/index.php?section=
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 See for example Mohanty, M., (1990) 'Structural 
Characteristics of the Mexican Economy, 1942-82', Social 
Scientist, Vol. 18, No. 5, May, pp 42-64 
7
 See the discussion in section III of Yúnez-Naude, A., 
(2002) “Lessons from NAFTA: The Case of Mexico’s 
Agricultural Sector.” Background paper for D. Lederman, 
W.F. Maloney and L.Serven, (2004), Lessons from NAFTA 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World Bank, 
April 
NAFTA, which entered into force in 1994, 
essentially built on all of the above 
institutional changes and sought to lock-in 
agricultural trade among NAFTA partners in 
terms of comparative advantage. Vis-à-vis 
the USA (and Canada), Mexico was at a 
comparative dis-advantage in grains (corn, 
wheat, rice), oilseeds, cattle rearing and 
forestry. It has a comparative advantage in 
fruits, vegetables sugar cane and coffee8. It 
was also felt that as a result of relatively 
backward and low-productivity agriculture, 
the share of agriculture and allied sectors in 
its workforce - in 1991 it accounted for 27% 
- was much larger than was warranted given 
its level of development.  
 
Comparative advantage driven 
modernization of agriculture therefore, it 
was hoped, would also help shift labour 
towards higher productivity non-agrarian 
occupations9. The hold of market 
fundamentalism was so strong among 
Mexico’s business and economic policy 
making elites that market driven 
comparative advantage was an article of 
faith. There was very little discussion of the 
fact that what is important for growth is not 
static but dynamic comparative advantage. 
That markets left to themselves, do not 
automatically deliver dynamic comparative 
advantage, which depends upon the 
evolution of institutions and technological 
and learning capabilities10. That successful 
development experience is also the 
successful shaping of the evolution of 
dynamic comparative advantage through 
purposive public policy11.  
                                                          
8
 See for example Appendini, K., (1994) ‘Agriculture and 
Farmers within NAFTA: A Mexican Perspective’ in V. 
Bulmer-Thomas, N. Craske, and M. Serrano (eds.), Mexico 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who 
Will Benefit?, St. Martins Press, New York. 
9
 See de Ita, A., (2008), ‘Fourteen Years of NAFTA and the 
Tortilla Crisis’, Americas Program Special Report, Center 
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 On the importance of dynamic comparative advantage and 
the role of policy in shaping it see Chapter 6 in  Krugman, P. 
and M. Obstfeld, (2006), International Economics : Theory 
and Policy, 7th Edition, Addison-Wesley 
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 See for example Chang, Ha-Joon, (2002), Kicking Away 
the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective, Anthem Press, London and New York 
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Be that as it may, as a result of NAFTA 
therefore, in agriculture and related trade, 
Mexico imports basic foodstuffs – corn, 
wheat, rice, soya, beef, pork, chicken meat, 
milk – and exports tomatoes, peppers, fruits, 
vegetables and beef cattle. Among agro-
based products beer, tequila and canned 
fruits and vegetables are important.  Some of 
the outcomes that designers of NAFTA had 
hoped for have come about. Agricultural 
exports have grown three-fold since the 
agreement and Mexico’s agricultural exports 
are today much more diversified towards 
higher value products. And before the 
current spike in the price of foodgrains, 
agricultural exports had finally begun 
growing faster than imports, narrowing the 
agricultural trade deficit. Equally 
importantly, there has been improvements in 
agricultural productivity. As a result, some 
economists have argued that NAFTA has 
been good for Mexican agriculture12. 
Despite these improvements, agriculture 
overall has not performed very well. Not 
only has it, in the post-NAFTA period, 
grown slower then GDP, but equally 
importantly, growth has decelerated as 
compared with the decade earlier13. 
 
Whatever be the gains that have been 
achieved, and as we have seen, there have 
been some, the very nature of these gains 
has adversely affected small farmers. And 
the reasons are fairly straightforward14. 12% 
of Mexico’s arable land is devoted to 
agriculture and 54% to cattle ranching. Of 
the cultivated land, 71% is devoted to grains 
and oilseeds and only 9% to fruits and 
vegetables. Therefore the bulk of cultivated 
area is adversely affected by import 
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 See for example Yúnez-Naude (2002). Also see 
Rosenzweig, A., (2005), El debate sobre el sector 
agropecuario mexicano en el Tratado de Libre Comercio 
de América del Norte, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas #30, 
Unidad Agricola, Cepal, Mexico; and  Hufbauer, G.C. and J. 
J. Schott, (2005) NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and 
Challenges, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
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 See de Ita (2008), ‘Fourteen Years of NAFTA and the 
Tortilla Crisis’. 
14
 This paragraph is based on de Ita (2008), ‘Fourteen Years 
of NAFTA and the Tortilla Crisis’. 
competition. 85% of Mexico’s farmers are 
small and marginal and grow largely grains 
and oilseeds. About 16% of farmers grow 
fruits and vegetables and most of these are 
medium and large farmers, largely because 
the investment required for growing fruits 
and vegetables is beyond the reach of most 
small-farmers. Therefore it is small farmers 
that have borne the brunt of import 
competition. 
 
The vacuum created by retreat of the 
Mexican state from agriculture was filled by 
large US and Mexican agribusiness. In the 
post-NAFTA period the bulk of FDI in 
agricultural sector has been in the agri-
business and agro-processing rather than 
agriculture15. As a result a few large trans-
national agribusiness firms, mostly US and 
Mexican, dominate storage, flour milling, 
grain trading16 and meat processing. Put 
differently they dominate the intermediation 
chain that takes crop or cattle and makes it a 
marketable commodity. Transnational 
agribusiness has used this dominant position 
and a process of vertical and horizontal 
integration to establish an overwhelming 
presence in the market for wheat, rice, corn, 
soya, poultry, meat, pork and eggs. 
Transnational agri-business tends to have 
much closer links with larger farmers and 
producers, who have better access to land, 
irrigation and credit, all of which are scarce 
commodities for small farmers17, 
particularly after the withdrawal of the state. 
And the little state assistance that remains 
tends to inordinately favour larger farmers. 
Little wonder then that it is the larger 
farmers that have taken advantage of global 
integration and changing cropping patterns 
and now account for a larger proportion of 
domestic markets. 
                                                          
15
 Carpentier, C.L., (2001), ‘Trade Liberalization Impacts of 
Agriculture: Predicted vs. realized’ Working Paper, North 
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
16
 On the concentration of agri-business in Mexico see pp 71-
72 in Rosenzweig (2005). 
17
 On the problems facing small and marginal farmers see 
Romero, J. and A. Puyana, (2004), Diez años con el 
TLCAN, las experiencias del sector agropecuario 
mexicano,  El Colegio de México, Mexico. See also the 
discussion on access to credit on pp 63-65 in Rosenzweig 
(2005). 
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Alongside this, as hoped for by designers of 
NAFTA, has been ‘modernisation’ - a sharp 
decline in the share of agriculture and allied 
sectors in the workforce. From nearly 27% 
in 1991 it declined to slightly less than 15% 
in 2006, losing more than 2 million jobs18. 
Again small and marginal farmers and 
agricultural labour bore the brunt, as 
evidenced by very sharp decline in the 
number of rural households. According to a 
study by Jose Romero and Alicia Puyana 
carried out for the federal government of 
Mexico, between 1992 and 2002, the 
number of agricultural households fell an 
astounding 75% - from 2.3 million to 575, 
00019. 
 
There has been a significant increase in 
migration out of rural areas as livelihoods 
are lost and farms have been abandoned. 
The hope was that this migration out of low-
productivity agriculture would be absorbed 
into higher-productivity non-agrarian urban 
employment. But anemic employment 
growth in the post-NAFTA period, 
particularly in manufacturing20, put paid to 
that. And what little employment there has 
been has largely been in the informal sector. 
As a result there has been a change in the 
pattern of rural out-migration. In the 1980s 
the likelihood of migrating to urban Mexico 
was higher than that of migrating to the 
USA. Today, as a result of anemic 
employment growth, the likelihood of 
migrating to the USA is significantly 
higher21. 
 
The World Bank estimates that between 
2000-05, 400,000 Mexicans migrated to the 
                                                          
18
 See de Ita (2008). Also see Polaski, S., (2006), The 
Employment Consequences of NAFTA, Testimony 
submitted to the Senate subcommittee on International Trade 
of the Committee on Finance 
19
 See Romero and Puyana, (2004), Diez años con el 
TLCAN, las experiencias del sector agropecuario 
mexicano. 
20
 See Polaski (2006), The Employment Consequences of 
NAFTA 
21
 See Yúnez-Naude, A., and J.E. Taylor (n.d.) Los impactos 
del TLCAN en la emigración rural, Folletín informativo No. 
2, PRECESAM, El Colegio de Mexico. Available at  
http://precesam.colmex.mx/Folletines/Folletin%20No.%202.
htm  
USA annually22. According to other 
estimates this number is closer to 500,00023. 
300,000 of these are from rural Mexico and 
again mostly small, marginal farmers and 
agricultural labour24. To put this in context 
between 1994 and 2004, Mexico’s labour 
force grew by approximately 1 million 
annually25. So effectively today Mexico 
imports food from the USA and exports 
farmers and agricultural labour. 
 
Again to lay all the problems of Mexican 
agriculture at NAFTA’s door would be 
incorrect26, though few would disagree that 
it has been a contributing factor. The 
problems facing Mexican agriculture are the 
result of systematic underinvestment in 
agriculture from the early 1980s, way before 
NAFTA was signed27. But the reason why 
NAFTA complicates matters is because it is 
a multilateral agreement that essentially 
protected rights of big capital (investor 
protection) and enhanced its mobility 
(within North America)28 to the detriment of 
other factors. In agriculture, it essentially 
protected the interests of large Mexican and 
US agri-business and adversely affected the 
ability of small and marginal farmers in 
Mexico to cope with import competition29. 
                                                          
22
 ‘México, el mayor expulsor de migrantes del planeta, dice 
el BM’ Roberto Gonzalez Amador, La Jornada, 16th April 
2007. Available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/04/16/index.php?section=
politica&article=003n1pol  
23
 See Spieldoch, A., (2008) ‘NAFTA Takes the Political 
Spotlight: It’s about time’, 17th March, Commentary, IATP 
Observatory. Available at 
http://www.iatp.org/iatp/commentaries.cfm?refID=102007 
24
 See ‘Desempleo, migración y escasez’ 26th December 
2007, La Jornada. Available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/12/26/index.php?section=
politica&article=003n2pol  
25
 See Polaski (2006), The Employment Consequences of 
NAFTA 
26
 See Romero and Puyana, (2004), Diez años con el 
TLCAN, las experiencias del sector agropecuario 
mexicano 
27
 See Romero and Puyana, (2004), Diez años con el 
TLCAN, las experiencias del sector agropecuario 
mexicano 
28
 See for example McDonald, M., (1996) Yankee Doodle 
Dandy: Brian Mulroney & the American Agenda, 
Stoddart Publishing, Toronto; and MacArthur, J.R., (2001), 
The Selling of "Free Trade" - NAFTA, Washington, and 
the Subversion of American Democracy, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, California. 
29
 See Appendini (1994), ‘Agriculture and Farmers within 
NAFTA: A Mexican Perspective’ 
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And this because their interests were not 
represented at the negotiating table30. It had 
been hoped that NAFTA would lead to an 
increase in investment in Mexican 
agriculture, but that did not materialize. A 
sector that accounts for more than 5% of 
GDP accounts for less than 1% of its 
investment and the underinvestment noted 
earlier has continued in the post-NAFTA 
period. And what investment there has been, 
as we have seen, marginalized small farmers 
even further by reducing their access to the 
intermediation chain and therefore their 
ability to compete in the market. 
 
It is not just the fact that Mexico’s small and 
marginal farmers have borne the brunt of the 
adjustment of Mexican agriculture’s 
integration into global markets. The spike in 
food prices in the last couple of years has 
put enormous pressure on its BOP and the 
agricultural trade deficit that had begun 
narrowing has widened sharply, putting in 
sharp focus issues of food security. 
According to the Mexico’s Inter-
Institutional Working Group on Foreign 
Trade the import bill for cereals more than 
doubled in the first trimester of 2008 as 
compared with the same period last year31. 
Even though no where as sharp as the 
increase in the cereal import bill, price 
increases has meant that import costs of 
oilseeds, milk, eggs, meat and meat products 
has increased significantly. At the same time 
prices for most of Mexico’s agricultural 
exports such as fruits and vegetables have 
either stagnated or declined. 
 
In many ways therefore, despite the strides 
in agricultural exports, Mexico’s NAFTA 
based transnational agri-business driven 
agricultural strategy must be deemed a 
failure. Food production has stagnated, 
cultivated area under food production has 
declined and the underinvestment that has 
                                                          
30
 See de Ita (2008). 
31
 See ‘Subieron 102% importaciones de cereales entre enero 
y marzo’ Juan Antonio Zúñiga, La Jornada, 20th May 2008. 
Available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/05/20/index.php?section=
economia&article=020n1eco 
characterized Mexican agriculture in the 
1980s has not been reversed. The problem of 
food security has reappeared and because of 
large migration of farmers and farm labour 
to USA, depleting the rural countryside of 
the human resources it requires for an 
agrarian revival, even if public policy chose 
to focus on it. 
 
III: An alternate modernisation model 
 
If the declining share of agriculture in the 
workforce alongside increasing per capita 
incomes is one of the most robust 
stylizations in development economics, it 
does not follow, as the experience of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan tells us, that the 
brunt of this adjustment necessarily has to 
be borne by small farmers. At issue is the 
nature of the agricultural modernization 
model – should it be based on land 
alienation driven by large farmer and 
transnational agri-business interests, where 
both these dominate the rural landscape; or 
will it be a model based on mixed income 
households where small farmers are 
competitive because of achieving economies 
of scale and scope in the purchase of inputs 
and in processing, storing, marketing and 
distributing their crops and with a significant 
proportion of household labour involved in 
non-farm activity as well. 
 
The key therefore lies in intermediating 
between the small farmer and the market in 
a way that enhances both his/her 
profitability and market opportunities. As 
Alicia Puyana commenting on the stagnation 
in Mexico’s grain production and the 
widening gap between USA and Mexico 
notes “To make domestic products 
competitive, it is not sufficient to open 
markets to foreign competition.”32 What 
development experience does teach us, and 
Mexico is a good example, is that the market 
                                                          
32
 Quoted in ‘El agro mexicano llega polarizado y mermado 
al último tramo del TLCAN’ Miriam Posadas y Matilde 
Pérez , La Jornada, 29th December 2007. Translation mine. 
Available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/12/29/index.php?section=
politica&article=005n1pol 
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left to itself will not invest in intermediation 
infrastructure for small farmers – credit, 
storage, marketing, input purchase and 
extension. Wherever such investment has 
happened it has been through co-operative 
mechanisms or public sector involvement or 
a mix of both. India’s dairy industry and the 
Amul brand are very good examples. 
Therefore both these – large farmer and 
trans-national agri-business centered and 
small farmer and co-operative agri-business 
centered - are feasible and extant models, 
even though most people (and most 
economists) associate modernization with 
the former. 
 
As Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, architect of 
India’s green-revolution and former Chair of 
the National Commission of Farmers, has 
repeatedly argued, India and other 
developing countries need a second green 
revolution but this time centered not around 
land alienation and large farmers but land 
conservation and small-farmers. He argues 
that the energy intensive agronomic 
practices of the first green revolution should 
be eschewed in favour of a small-farmer 
based green revolution where traditional 
methods of soil health enhancement and pest 
management should be refined and blended 
with modern technology33.  
 
A small-farmer centered green revolution 
alongside a co-operative and/or public sector 
driven investment in market intermediation 
infrastructure – credit, extension, input-
purchase, storage, trading, marketing, and 
insurance – would ensure that small farmers 
are both profitable and productive. This 
strategy would, as he argues, address 
concerns about food-security, livelihood 
security, environmental conservation and 
sustainable growth. Therefore one part of 
the solution to the problem of food-security 
and sustainable growth is in the hands of 
450 million small and marginal farmers 
(globally) that neoliberal economic policy 
                                                          
33
 See ‘Global Food Crisis and Indian Response’, M.S. 
Swaminathan, The Hindu, 2nd June 2008. Available at 
http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/02/stories/200806025506100
0.htm  
has tried so hard to alienate from their land. 
And in addition if we are able to put in place 
a strategy of maximising non-agrarian 
employment growth, then rural-to-urban 
migration, which is necessary concomitant 
of per capita income growth, would be a 
matter of choice and not compulsion. 
 
It is useful to remember that in 1991 – prior 
to the advent of NAFTA - agriculture and 
allied activities only accounted for 27% of 
Mexico’s labour force. In other words, the 
occupational structure transition that is 
characteristic of increasing per capita 
incomes was already underway. For most 
developing countries including India 
however, even today agriculture and allied 
activities account for more than 50% of their 
workforce. Therefore an agricultural 
modernization programme that does not take 
into account the needs of small and marginal 
farmers and agricultural labour would not 
only economically but equally importantly, 
politically, unsustainable. Equally, it is 
important to remember that 95 percent of the 
world small and marginal farmers live in 
poor, developing countries and that 75% of 
the world’s poor survive on agriculture. For 
developing countries therefore the key to 
both food security and livelihood security is 
the ability to protect small and marginal 
farmers from unfair competition and the 
policy space within which develop an 
agricultural policy centered around small-
farmers and the maximization of 
employment growth. 
 
Therefore whether or not Mexico’s current 
agrarian crisis can be blamed entirely in 
NAFTA is beside the point. What it does 
suggest however is that when economies 
asymmetrically situated in terms of 
productivity integrate, then left to the 
market, the burden of adjustment is borne by 
agents with the lowest productivity – in this 
instance small farmers and agricultural 
labour in Mexico. This effect gets 
compounded when agents in the higher 
productivity economies are subsidized to 
maintain income levels (in this instance 
farmers in USA and Canada). But as we 
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have seen integration and modernization 
does not have to be like this. Economies 
should be allowed to choose the pace and 
pattern of integration and modernisation, 
defined as sustained and sustainable increase 
in per capita incomes, depending upon their 
institutional structures and historical 
trajectories. Clearly one size does not fit all. 
Therefore if developing countries are not 
given the policy space within which to 
protect small and marginal farmers and 
modernize their agriculture, they should 
walk away from Doha. Most in any case do 
not even have Mexico’s option of exporting 
farmers and farm labour to USA. 
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